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THE 1995 ELECTIONS IN PERU: 
END OF THE LINE FOR THE PARTY SYSTEM? 
Throughout Latin America in the 1990s, political parties are facing testing 
times. Evidence from opinion polls across the region attests to the low esteem 
in which parties and their leaders are held. Indeed, in many countries, 
parliamentary institutions themselves command little respect. The emergence 
of political 'outsiders' and 'independents' on the political stage, often at the 
expense of party politicians, is another feature of this phenomenon. 
So, while a process of 'democratic consolidation' may be taking place, 
there are certainly powerful counter-currents at work which, while not 
necessarily overturning formal democratic institutions, are tending to drain 
them of their real democratic content. Instead, they establish more 'top-
down' authoritarian types of regime, underpinned by a new and sometimes 
charismatic rapport with a mass public, bypassing traditional forms of 
intermediation.1 
President Alberto Fujimori of Peru is an egregious example of this style of 
leadership. Coming to office in 1990 on a wave of rejection of traditional 
parties, he consolidated his hold on power by means of a palace coup (or 
autogolpe) in April 1992. He proceeded to change the constitution to permit 
his own re-election in 1995. In doing so he consistently sought to mobilise 
public opinion against what he called the 'partidocracia', which he lambasted 
as being responsible for the country's political and economic ills. 
For the Peruvian party system, the general elections of 9 April 1995 and 
the campaign leading up to them were in some respects 'una cronica de una 
muerte anunciada9. They confirmed what many political analysts had been 
pointing out repeatedly during the preceding five years: that the party system 
no longer represented public opinion. Indeed, they confirmed it more 
emphatically than most observers had expected. Not only did Fujimori -
whose popularity during the previous five years appeared to vary in inverse 
proportion to that of the political parties - achieve re-election with an 
overwhelming 64.4% of the valid vote, but the total received by the 
traditional parties combined was reduced to a paltry 6.3 %. As if to underline 
the point, the electoral law specified that each party automatically lost official 
recognition if it failed to reach 5% of the vote. Furthermore, in the 
1 This has been referred to as 'neopopulism'. In the case of Peru, for 
instance, see Aldo Panfichi and Cynthia Sanborn, 'Vino viejo en odres nuevos? 
Democracia y neo-populismo en el Peru,' Mar genes (forthcoming). 
congressional elections held at the same time, the four main parties won only 
17 seats out of a total 120, with the rest of the future legislature composed of 
non-party groupings, and Fujimori's own 'non-party' party, Cambio 90-
Nueva Mayoria, enjoying an overall majority with 67 seats. 
How was it that the major parties - which during the 1980s regularly 
accounted for at least 90 % of the vote in successive elections - fell so foul of 
the electorate? How strong or representative was the party system in the first 
place? Are Peru's parties now spent forces, or do they have the capacity to 
recover? This brief essay seeks to broach some of these questions by 
examining the impact of extreme instability - both economic and political -
on political behaviour and party loyalties. It poses the question of whether, 
indeed, it is possible to have a democratic dispensation at all without some 
sort of system of party representation bridging the gulf between civil society 
and the state, helping to aggregate political interests and facilitating the 
legitimisation of government. 
The essay addresses four main questions. First it seeks to trace the 
development of Peru's political parties and to ask at what stage we can really 
speak of the appearance of a 'party system'. Secondly, it proceeds to examine 
the effects that both macroeconomic instability (in particular hyperinflation) 
and the growth of political and social violence had on the emergent party 
system. Thirdly, it addresses the phenomenon of 'plebiscitarian democracy' 
as practised by Fujimori in the early 1990s. Finally, it seeks to pose some 
general questions as to the conditions that might (or might not) be conducive 
to the recovery of the political parties. 
The genesis of a party system 
Peru is not a country with strong democratic traditions.2 Although civilian 
parties existed in the nineteenth century, they were not in any sense mass-
based parties that integrated the whole population into politics. Nor did they 
survive long into the twentieth. Peruvian politics for much of this present 
century has been characterised by lengthy periods of authoritarian (often 
military) government, punctuated only by brief spells of more liberal 
governance emanating from a restricted franchise. Between 1920 and 1980, 
there were only twelve years in which we could say that there was some sort 
of democratic government. 
2 John Crabtree, Peru under Garcia: An Opportunity Lost (Basingstoke, 
1992). 
For most of this period, the majority of the population was effectively 
excluded from the formal political system. Whereas in countries like Mexico, 
the mass burst upon the scene as a consequence of revolutionary upsurge, or 
in Argentina by virtue of populist-style mobilisation, in Peru the process of 
political integration was long delayed. In large part, this was because the 
country's largest mass-based political party, Haya de la Torre's Alianza 
Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), was anathema to the Peruvian 
elite and armed forces. Even though by the 1940s it had dropped most of its 
more radical pretensions, it was effectively excluded from government.3 
Indeed, by the late 1960s, it seemed that the armed forces themselves had 
assumed APRA's agenda of social reform (thereby threatening to render the 
party obsolete) in an attempt to break traditional economic and political 
structures 'from above' through bureaucratic and authoritarian means. 
This, of course, is not to argue that political parties like APRA lacked 
importance, nor that they failed to reflect live forces in society, but rather to 
question the existence of a party system as such. Of the two major parties to 
emerge from the economic dislocation of the late 1920s, APRA became much 
more significant than the Communist Party (PCP) in terms of the numbers it 
could mobilise, in part because of the untimely death of Jose Carlos 
Mariategui, the PCP's founder and mentor. Under Haya's charismatic 
leadership, APRA was able to build up a mass following, bound together by 
a tight organisational structure, a strong system of party discipline, and a 
pronounced regional concentration in the northern part of the country. It 
proved capable of surviving lengthy periods of fierce repression, which 
indeed helped it forge a degree of organisational solidity. In the 1950s a new 
party, Action Popular (AP), founded by Fernando Belaunde around a 
reforming ideology, arose to challenge the primacy of APRA, although it 
never managed to reproduce the same degree of party cohesion. Drawing on 
a widespread spirit of anti-Aprismo, Belaunde was able successfully to 
challenge APRA in the 1963 elections. Furthermore, with the emergence of 
a Christian Democrat party in the 1960s, parallelling those of many other 
Latin American countries, it is perhaps possible to speak of a party system 
emerging. However, this period of incipient party competition was to prove 
short-lived, brought to an abrupt end by the 1968 coup of General Juan 
Velasco Alvarado. 
The main characteristics of these party formations were their authoritarian, 
hierarchical and personalista nature, traits common enough in Latin America 
generally but especially typical of Peru. They were particularly the hallmark 
3 The party participated only as a junior partner during two brief spells, the 
first in the late 1940s under President Jose Luis Bustamente y Rivero, and then 
in the late 1950s under Manuel Prado. 
of APRA, over which Haya's dominance was only brought to an end by his 
death in 1979. Haya ruled APRA in an autocratic and paternalistic fashion 
from the top down. Being the source of party doctrine and strategy, he 
discouraged internal party democracy and tolerated no dissent. He elicited 
almost religious loyalty among his followers, insisting on absolute discipline 
and acquiescence and establishing the party machinery to that end.4 The 
same was the case, but to a lesser degree, of AP, whose ideological stance 
was a close reflection of the preoccupations of Belaunde, its founder and 
leader. The Christian Democrat Party (PDC) and its right-wing offshoot, the 
Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC), had similar traits, being 'top-down' parties 
with dominant leaders. Furthermore, the left-wing Marxist parties, stimulated 
by the 1959 Cuban revolution, also developed along these hierarchical and 
personalista lines. While the need for such an approach could be justified by 
adhesion to Leninist vanguardism and democratic centralism, the 
authoritarianism that these principles embodied reflected strong local 
traditions. 
Not only was there no strong legacy of a functioning party system, but 
none of internal party democracy either. Reflecting the gulfs in society itself, 
there tended to be a deep divide between the leaders and the led. While 
parties could represent an important avenue of social advancement in an 
otherwise stratified society in which mobility was restricted, decision-making 
was generally monopolised by a small group or a single person. As a result, 
parties tended to develop on a weak institutional basis with a lack of 
intermediate cadres linking the rank and file with the leadership. They 
remained highly dependent on the survival of leaders, and prone to crises on 
their demise, the succession crisis within APRA on Haya's death being a 
notable case in point. They also lacked the mechanisms by which internal 
dissent could be resolved through compromise, thus tending to lead to the 
reproduction of small parties with similar characteristics, themselves prone 
to further fragmentation. Peru's parties therefore failed to provide an 
effective link between the interests of the majority of the population and 
decision-making at government level. 
The 1968 coup brought the democratic opening, which had begun with the 
inconclusive 1962 presidential elections and Belaunde's election victory the 
following year, to an abrupt end. The coup took place amid charges of 
corruption and incompetence, and a widespread perception that democratic 
institutions were unsuitable for a country like Peru that required radical 
4 On the way in which APRA sought to capitalise on popular religiosity in 
the creation of a political movement in which 'faith' underscored loyalty, see 
Imelda Vega Centeno, Aprismo popular: mito, cultura e historia (Lima, 1985; 
first edition). 
structural change and where the political elite had shown itself ill-suited to 
expediting the task. The criticisms of politicians and party politics at this time 
foreshadowed some of the debates thirty years later. 
However, in spite of its pretensions to mobilise the masses within a 
framework of popular participation, the military government proved no more 
successful than the political parties it replaced in forging new links between 
civil society and the state. Instead, by removing some of the traditional 
mechanisms of social control and awakening expectations through its rhetoric 
of social transformation, it contributed to the involvement of the mass in 
politics, but not in the orderly way it had hoped. Contrary to the intentions 
of the army, the Marxist left took advantage of the climate of mobilisation 
and, in the absence of other parties, made important gains in terms of 
establishing control of representative institutions, particularly among the 
trade unions, peasant federations, and to a lesser extent in the rapidly 
growing urban shanty towns. 
By the end of the military government in 1980, the nature of politics had 
changed, with the mass much more engaged in the political process than 
before. Recognising this fact, the 1979 constitution established universal 
franchise for all over the age of 18, irrespective of social status, sex or 
literacy. The political parties that emerged during the transition to democracy 
between 1977 and 1980 thus found themselves having to compete for votes 
in free elections, conducted reasonably fairly, among an electorate of less 
passive subjects than in the past.5 Party political activity coalesced around 
three ideologically distinct blocs, reflecting the wide political diversity to be 
found in society as a whole. On the right, AP and the PPC supported 
Belaunde who returned as president in 1980, favouring a neo-liberal approach 
tempered by the president's own more populist inclinations; on the centre-
left, Alan Garcia sought to breathe new life into APRA, to expand its appeal 
among new sectors and to turn its traditionally ambiguous ideology in a 
social-democratic direction; and on the left, the formation of the Izquierda 
Unida (United Left) in 1980 created an electoral vehicle capable of bridging 
the sectarian divides and reversing the earlier tendency towards atomisation 
among the Marxist left. To varying degrees, then, all these forces were 
obliged to put down roots in civil society in order to compete electorally, 
while at the same time trying to devise workable programmes of government. 
In the early 1980s, there was an air of optimism about the prospects for 
creating a functioning democracy in Peru, in spite of the difficult economic 
problems afflicting the country (exacerbated after 1982 by the debt crisis) and 
5 Fernando Tuesta, Peru politico, en cifras: elite politico y elecciones (Lima, 
1994). This provides a useful description of the workings of the party system, 
with details of electoral outcomes from 1931 to 1993. 
the persistence of deep economic, social and cultural divides. Although 
election results during the 1980s revealed a strong degree of volatility6 -
suggesting that party loyalties were still weak - it is therefore possible to talk 
of an emergent party system. 
The Crisis of Political Representation. 
By 1990 the party system was in tatters. The first round of presidential 
elections in April 1990 was characterised by deep public disillusion in all the 
political options on offer. It was a measure of the political vacuum that a 
month before polling day few had ever heard of the candidate (Alberto 
Fujimori) who was to emerge in second place, going forward to beat Mario 
Vargas Llosa, the internationally famed novelist and candidate for the right-
wing Fredemo coalition, in the second round by a decisive margin of 56% to 
34%. Alberto Fujimori possessed neither a well-oiled political machine nor 
a copious campaign war-chest, yet he was able to exploit a deeply-felt 
antipathy to the parties that voters believed had brought Peru to the edge of 
the abyss. 
The crisis of the political parties is, of course, a phenomenon that affects 
most of the other countries of Latin America and, indeed, well beyond. It has 
been derived from a number of factors that are common throughout the 
region. Prime among them has been the apparent failure of conventional 
political leaders to deal with the economic and social problems that have 
afflicted the whole of Latin America as a result of the debt crisis. Politicians 
have seemed to be powerless to rescue their countries from the negative 
effects of the crisis, and in particular from the assault on living standards. 
The debt crisis also gave rise to a fiscal crisis of the state, which greatly 
reduced the resources available to politicians to distribute as largesse to, and 
thus command loyalty among, their specific clienteles. Another common 
feature, much in evidence throughout Latin America has been the growing 
influence of television in political campaigning. This has changed the nature 
of political debate, reducing (often radically) the extent of personal contact 
between politicians and their public. The political rally, and the oratory that 
went with it, is now much less in evidence than it used to be, even in election 
campaigns. The television personality himself has become a major political 
figure in his own right in some instances. In Peru, the election of chat show 
6 Henry Dietz, 'Aspects of Peruvian Politics: Electoral Politics in Peru, 
1978-1986', Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, vol. 28, no. 
4, Winter 1986-87. 
impresario Ricardo Belmont as mayor of Lima in 19897 and his re-election 
in 1993 is a case in point. Finally, and as many authors have noted, the fall 
of the Berlin wall and the collapse of Soviet communism removed one of the 
major ideological divides that had separated right and left in Latin America 
for some fifty years, giving rise to a new and much less ideological sort of 
politics. 
In Peru, the unpopularity of the political parties has probably been more 
pronounced than in most other countries of the region. To understand the 
reason for this, it is necessary to focus on the particularly severe nature of 
the political and economic crisis that afflicted the country in the last three 
years of the 1980s, since it sets Peru apart from the rest of Latin America. 
On the one hand, Peru underwent a process of hyperinflation with prices 
rising by as much as 7,000% in the last year of the Garcia government. On 
the other hand, it faced one of the most severe public order problems 
anywhere in the region.8 The government was pitched against the Maoist-
inspired Sendero Luminoso, a ruthless and implacable guerrilla organisation, 
which had surfaced in 1980 in Ayacucho and surrounding areas. By 1990 it 
appeared to be losing the battle. Sendero had spread its influence over much 
of the country (including Lima), and had perpetrated a civil conflict in which 
more than 20,000 people had been killed. At the same time, the government 
faced another, perhaps less serious guerrilla challenge from the Cuban-
inspired Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA), all amid a 
climate of generalised social violence in which the authorities appeared 
incapable of imposing law and order. 
These two elements - each present individually elsewhere in Latin America 
but not in the same combination - created a 'psychosis of insecurity' among 
all sectors of the public, especially among the poor, those least able to protect 
themselves from either. In the process, it became evident that neither the 
state nor, still less, the political parties, could provide adequate protection to 
the population as a whole. Their utility was therefore called increasingly into 
question. 
7 The municipal elections of 1989, rather than the presidential elections of 
1990, were the first clear sign of the public's reaction against the traditional 
parties and their leaders, and its preference for 'independents' promising 
honesty and efficiency. Belmont's grouping, Obras, swept the board in Lima, 
winning 45% of the vote, almost twice that of his nearest rival. 
8 On Sendero, see Gustavo Gorriti, Sendero (Lima, 1990); Simon Strong, 
Shining Path (London, 1992), and John Crabtree, Peru under Garcia, chs. 3 
and 6. 
There is little doubt that periods of very high inflation are extremely 
harmful to living standards, especially for those unable to fix the market 
price of their labour. The Peruvian experience of hyperinflation and 
economic contraction - referred to by some as 'hyper-stagflation' - further 
exacerbated poverty and accentuated income and wealth disparities. The real 
purchasing power of wages for the majority sank rapidly, unemployment and 
sub-employment increased to levels unknown before, and government social 
spending dried up. Not only did this process further dramatise the incapacity 
of the political elite to manage the economy successfully9 - APRA was 
immediately to blame in 1990 but the incapacity of the previous AP-PPC 
coalition had also led to desgaste - but the crisis had social effects that 
undermined party organisation. Moreover, the influx of labour into the 
informal sector of the economy expanded a highly heterogenous social 
formation, occupationally fragmented and notoriously difficult to organise 
politically. The informal sector is typically composed of individual 
producers, pitted against one another in intense competition and bound 
together by little sense of class solidarity. The rapid expansion of this sector, 
however, has made it a crucial electoral resource in the competition for 
political power. 
By the same token, the crisis had a crippling effect on formal sector 
employment, and in particular on the trade unions, the backbone of a number 
of parties, especially on the left. The waning influence of the unions is shown 
by their inability to protect their members' interests, especially wages, from 
the ravages of hyperinflation in the late 1980s. Beyond unions, the effects of 
economic dislocation also debilitated other organisations in civil society, 
some of them highly politicised, which had previously sought political 
expression through the party system. Grass-roots organisations found 
themselves obliged to react to the immediate and practical demands of their 
public. This was the case, for example, of the comedores populares which 
proliferated in areas of urban poverty as a means by which families managed 
to sustain the most basic levels of nutrition. Frequently, neighbourhood 
associations had also tended to be closely associated with parties, especially 
those of the left. However, the struggle for survival often had a de-
politicising effect, especially when the parties were blamed for the economic 
problems in the first place. 
The climate of violence also helped weaken party loyalties, especially in 
the areas most directly affected. Once again, worst hit were the parties of the 
left which enjoyed more of an organised presence in these areas than those 
of the right. In the crossfire between Sendero and the military, there was 
9 Luis Pasara, 'El ocaso de los partidos', in Augusto Alvarez (ed.), El 
poder en el Peru (Lima, 1993). 
little room for independent party activity. Both sides cared little for those 
organised groups they could not control: the military chose not to distinguish 
too closely between Senderistas and other more democratically-inclined 
leftists, while for Sendero all those who accepted what it termed 
'parliamentary cretinism' were enemies of the revolution and therefore 
legitimate military targets. The army's strategy of counter-insurgency 
involved the creation of militarised zones, in which there was little scope for 
party activity (except perhaps at elections) and in which elected public 
authorities were subordinate to the military in everyday decision-making. The 
expansion of the radius of Sendero's activities led to a corresponding growth 
in the number of provinces and departments placed under such regimes of 
exception; by 1994, there were 66 provinces affected in this way, many of 
them under direct military jurisdiction. The scope for normal democratic 
activity therefore became circumscribed. Meanwhile, in Lima, party leaders 
failed to produce convincing alternatives for quelling Sendero, beyond simply 
ceding further responsibility to the military authorities. Even the left, which 
criticised the violation of human rights by the security forces, did little to 
formulate an effective alternative strategy. 
Thus, by 1990, on the eve of the elections, none of Peru's major political 
parties or coalitions offered the electorate a coherent vision of how to stem 
the apparently inexorable drift towards poverty, violence and despair. The 
terrain was propitious for the emergence of independents, capable of 
exploiting the deeply-felt disenchantment towards the political establishment. 
In such circumstances, to vote to re-elect APR A - and remarkably 22% of the 
electorate still did so in the first round of polling in 1990 - was to vote for 
more of the same. To vote for the left, which had recently split into two 
feuding camps, was to opt for an ill-defined radical alternative which many 
thought would just make matters worse. And to vote for the right, which had 
united in the Fredemo coalition (a combination of AP, PPC plus a number of 
independents) was to invite4 shock treatment without anaesthesia', the remedy 
prescribed by Vargas Llosa. In this context, a little-known agronomist, 
promising 'honesty, work and technology' and challenging the ideological 
posturings and double-talk of the traditional politicians, found that he was 
able to make an entree into the political arena. No-one guessed, however, 
including Fujimori himself, that he had any hope of clinching the ultimate 
political prize. 
Fujimori and plebiscitarian democracy 
Fujimori's extraordinary election victory in 1990 was a manifestation of the 
breakdown of that party system which had begun to take root ten years 
before, a breakdown hastened by the twin 'earthquakes' of hyperinflation and 
terrorist violence.10 His simple anti-ideological message struck a chord 
among an electorate tired of the much-vaunted promises of the party leaders, 
and anxious more for a return to stability than for further leaps into the 
unknown. His fairly humble social origins and his Japanese ancestry 
distinguished him from the traditional political elite. However, while the 
'Fujimori phenomenon' was a vote of no-confidence in the political 
alternatives on offer, it led to the installation of a government which lacked 
any organised base in society. Fujimori's 'party', Cambio 90 (subsequntly 
known as Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoria), was a motley assortment of 
individuals, some with ties to the evangelical churches or small-scale 
business, but most lacking any organised presence in society. Because of the 
circumstances of the election, Cambio 90 was the first ruling party since 1980 
not to hold a majority in Congress, where Vargas Llosa's Fredemo followers 
formed the largest single bloc. It was a government, therefore, which seemed 
weakly constituted, lacking a specific constituency in society and dependent 
on alliances in Congress to pass legislation. 
Fujimori was aware of these weaknesses. Even before taking office he 
sought to develop a much closer relationship with the military than his 
predecessors had done; and the military - struggling to subdue Sendero 
Luminoso - was content to find itself in a situation in which its leverage over 
the executive power was greatly increased. Fujimori thus sought to develop 
a wider system of alliances which by-passed the established parties. On the 
one hand, by initiating a programme of radical liberalisation of the economy, 
he attempted to build links with the private sector and to exploit its long-
standing mistrust of party politics.11 On the other, he tried to develop a 
rapport with the public at large by building on his electoral success. His 
ability to maintain high indices of personal popularity despite the severe 
social cost of his initial stabilisation policies, showed that it was possible to 
pursue unpopular adjustment policies without sabotaging personal popularity, 
so long as the net result was the maintenance of stable prices. He turned out 
to have considerably more political room for manoeuvre than had appeared 
at first sight. 
Fujimori's autogolpe on 5 April 1992 aimed to take advantage of the low 
standing of the politicians in Congress and their parties and to further expand 
10 Mario Vargas Llosa, El pez en el agua: memorias (Barcelona, 1993); 
Carlos Ivan Degregori and Romeo Grompone, Demonios y redentores del nuevo 
Peru: una tragedia en dos vueltas (Lima, 1991). 
11 Francisco Durand, Business and Politics in Peru (Boulder, 1994). 
that room for manoeuvre.12 The president had noticed in opinion polls how 
his attacks on what he called the 4partidocracia' had boosted his own 
personal popularity. Indeed, the polls suggested that his popularity varied 
almost in direct proportion to those of the parties. At the same time, the 
autogolpe further solidified the relationship between the president and the 
military. Army leaders had been antagonised by Congress's voting down of 
legislation the previous November, intended to give them wider legal powers 
to conduct counter-insurgency operations with greater impunity. Closure of 
Congress therefore not only removed an obstacle both to legislative change 
and to Fujimori's own authority; it also permitted him to rewrite the rules of 
the political game along lines that suited him best. 
In the months that followed the autogolpe, Fujimori consolidated the new 
order by holding fresh congressional elections to a single-party assembly 
which, in addition to normal legislative tasks, was vested with powers to 
reform the constitution. Having set the rules governing participation in the 
elections, and exploiting the divisions among the parties over whether to 
stand or not, Fujimori managed to ensure that his partisans attained an 
absolute majority.13 During the election campaign, his standing was given 
a sudden and unexpected boost by the capture of Sendero's founder and 
leader, Abimael Guzman. 
The reformed constitution reduced the powers and autonomy of the 
legislature, increased those of the military (especially in adjudicating cases 
of terrorism), introduced the death penalty for terrorism, and - most 
importantly - lifted the legal bar on a president seeking immediate re-
election. In order to seal its legitimacy, Fujimori ordered that the new 
constitution be put to a referendum. This was held in October 1993, and to 
the surprise of both the government, its opponents and other observers, the 
'yes' vote won only by the slimmest of margins. The result served as a 
salutory reminder to Fujimori that he could not take his popularity for 
granted, especially in rural areas outside Lima. 
The Fujimori government, as it evolved between 1990 and 1995, therefore 
represented something of a hybrid regime. While it did not involve a return 
to the sort of military dictatorship that had ruled Peru in the 1970s, it was not 
a government that sought to develop or consolidate the democratic institutions 
that had begun to take root in the 1980s. Fujimori made no pretence of his 
12 See Eduardo Ferrero Costa, 'Peru: Presidential Coup', Journal of 
Democracy, vol. 14, no. 1, January 1993. 
13 John Crabtree, 'The Peruvian Congressional Elections of 1992', Electoral 
Studies, vol. 12, no. 3, 1993. 
distaste for consensus government in which representative institutions were 
integrated into the processes of government. His focus on efficiency and 
gerencia in government led him to run the country almost as if it were his 
own private company. In this scheme of things, the pattern of command was 
highly hierarchical, with ministers enjoying little autonomy of action.14 
In spite of its allowing political parties to function and take part in electoral 
contests, there could be no hiding the fact that Fujimori had arbitrarily 
overturned the established rules of the game, and created a new order in 
which his own executive power was enhanced at the expense of the other 
powers of the state. This concentration of power in the executive was, of 
course, not new; both Presidents Belaunde and Garcia had been variously 
criticised for their disdainful attitude towards Congress and the judiciary. 
Fujimori, however, took this to new lengths, justifying his stand by arguing 
that tough and authoritarian government was indispensable to deal with the 
country's problems. Arguments over whether the autogolpe was justifiable 
seem set to continue, with Fujimori's critics pointing to the support afforded 
by the majority in Congress to his economic policies prior to April 1992, and 
questioning Fujimori's view that Guzman's capture would have been 
impossible under the old rules. 
Also characteristic of the Fuj imori government was its personalismo, a trait 
which - as we have also seen - has a long track record in Peruvian political 
history. The concentration of power was, in part, a product of Fujimori's 
unwillingness to trust in, or work with other political leaders, and his own 
dominance over his own partisans, most of whom depended on him for their 
positions and who had little or no experience of elective office prior to 1990. 
Wishing himself to be the mainspring of political action, he sought to spurn 
rather than coopt rivals, and to develop a direct rapport with the mass public. 
He preferred to work through a small group of trusted sympathisers (often his 
family), and distance himself from those who might appear to have ambitions 
of their own. Embedded in Peruvian political tradition, this style of politics 
is perhaps not best suited to the development of democratic institutions. 
The country's party system also suffered as a result, with the president 
constantly seeking to profit from the discomfiture of the parties, and the 
difficulty they faced (especially after 1992) in articulating public concerns. 
Furthermore, the parties also suffered the consequences of his government's 
14 In his stimulating biographical sketch of Fujimori's background, Luis 
Jochamowitz concludes that Fujimori possessed three key characteristics that 
underscored his life and which determined his approach to politics: pragmatism, 
authoritarianism and a highly secretive nature (hermetismo). See Luis 
Jochamowitz, Ciudadano Fujimori (Lima, 1993). 
neo-liberal economic policies, especially those on the left. If the rise in 
unemployment and the fall in living standards had eroded union support in the 
late 1980s, the government's privatisation strategy and its liberalisation of 
labour markets compounded their problems in the early 1990s. The unions, 
in particular, found themselves powerless to resist, even in sectors where 
once they had been strong, and the parties of the left - removed from the 
areas of decision-making and political power - could offer little by way of 
support. 
In this context, a peculiar mix of democracy and authoritarianism -
labelled 'democradura' by some analysts - emerged in which the legitimacy 
of government based itself on a 'direct link' without intermediaries between 
president and the people. Democratic forms persisted, but without much 
content; and indeed the democratic forms themselves were not immune from 
arbitrary and unconstitutional moves by the executive, as the 1992 autogolpe 
showed. It is therefore pertinent to ask whether such a system will prove 
sustainable, or whether a more party-based alternative will eventually 
reassert itself. As in the past, the problems of succession may eventually 
prove Fujimori's undoing, a problem at least postponed by the removal of the 
constitutional bar on immediate re-election. 
Pointers to the future 
The 1995 presidential elections proved Fujimori unstoppable. His main 
opponent, the former UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar - chosen 
because of his potential for uniting a divided opposition around a single 
candidate - failed to capture the popular imagination. Most of the main 
established political parties, concerned not to let the opportunity pass to 
reassert themselves on the political stage, ended up fielding their own 
candidates.15 Fujimori, who won outright by a large margin on the first 
ballot, had shown himself immune from criticisms that in other circumstances 
might have caused him considerable political damage. For instance, at the 
beginning of the election campaign, accused by none less than his estranged 
wife of encouraging corruption at the heart of government, Fujimori managed 
to shrug off the charges. Then, with only two months to go before the 
elections, he successfully minimised the impact of Peru's humiliation at the 
15 The exception here was the PPC, which only presented candidates for the 
congressional elections. 
hands of Ecuador following the border skirmish in the Cordillera del 
Condor.16 
His election landslide helped Fujimori to consolidate his grip on power and 
to legitimise his government both at home and abroad with respect to the 
1992 autogolpe. Not only did he deal a humiliating blow to his rivals, and a 
devastating one to the parties, but - against most predictions - he clinched an 
absolute majority in Congress. At the very least, his opponents had been 
hoping that a sufficient proportion of the electorate would split their ballots 
(rather than vote for the uninspiring names which made up most of the 
Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoria list) and thereby maintain a counterweight to 
executive power. In the event, Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoria won 67 seats in the 
120-seat Congress. Moreover, in the presidential election, Fujimori won a 
commanding lead, even in those parts of the country where opposition was 
best organised and anti-government sentiment (as measured by the 1993 
constitutional referendum result) strongest. In Puno, for instance, long a 
bastion of the left where nearly 80% had voted 'no' in the referendum, 
Fujimori polled nearly 65%.17 In La Libertad, traditionally the APRA 
heartland, Mercedes Cabanillas, the party's presidential candidate, managed 
only a meagre 14%, compared with 59% for Fujimori. 
The prime causes of this electoral landslide in Fujimori's favour were his 
success in slaying the twin dragons of hyperinflation and terrorist violence. 
As we have seen, together these produced a climate of insecurity which upset 
party allegiances, producing a situation in which firm, decisive and 
successful government brought enormous dividends. In addition, the 
economic recovery in 1993 and 1994 - albeit from an extremely low base -
generated an ethos of optimism about the future which stood in stark contrast 
with the profound pessimism prevalent a few years earlier.18 In such 
circumstances, it proved very difficult for the opposition to mobilise public 
16 Polls conducted in March 1995 suggested that only 6% of those 
interviewed thought that the border war with Ecuador was a major issue, an 
extraordinary finding in view of Peru's traditionally nationalistic reflexes in 
domestic politics. 
17 Evidence of fraud in favour of Fujimori and Cambio 90 came to light in 
the wake of the elections, but the scale was not such as to call his victory into 
doubt. 
18 According to a survey conducted by the Datum polling agency shortly 
before the elections, 79% of those interviewed believed that economic 
performance would continue to improve in the following five years, while only 
2% thought it would deteriorate. 
opinion around issues such as democratic rights, greater accountability or 
decentralisation. The opposition's strongest card was its ability to exploit 
discontent about the very high levels of unemployment still prevalent. But 
while opinion polls attest to the fact that this was a major preoccupation, it 
does not appear to have been the decisive criterion at the moment of voting. 
Fujimori's other great advantage was that for two whole years he had been 
on the campaign trail, touring the country, especially in areas furthest from 
Lima where the outcome of the referendum had been least favourable to him. 
Often for three or four days a week, he would absent himself from Lima, 
visiting as many as six communities a day. There can be little doubt that this 
personal contact, combined with the distribution of gifts and promises of 
public works (usually subsequently fulfilled), help explain the turnaround in 
voting behaviour in his favour. The opposition candidates, starting late in the 
day and lacking access to official resources, found themselves at a 
considerable disadvantage. 
The results of the election sent a powerful and depressing message to the 
parties and their leaders. Together they polled only 6.4% of the vote, 
compared with well over 90% throughout the 1980s. The party with the 
strongest vote was APR A with only 4.2%; AP won 1.7% and the Izquierda 
Unida 0.6%. Having failed to reach 5% of the vote, they automatically lost 
official recognition. However, in analysing the implications for the future of 
the parties, it is important to bear in mind two points. First, a large 
proportion of those who would normally have voted for political parties 
probably voted for Perez de Cuellar, aware that he represented the only 
realistic possibility of preventing Fujimori winning a second term. The 6.4% 
combined vote for the parties therefore probably understates their real 
electoral support, even though this was clearly much diminished. Secondly, 
Fujimori's popularity does not necessarily translate into public support for 
those seeking public office on his coat-tails. Thus, in elections in which the 
president is not himself standing, the parties could reasonably hope to fare 
better. 
The November 1995 municipal elections may produce results more 
favourable to the parties than the general elections seven months earlier. This 
was the case, for instance, in the January 1993 municipal elections when, in 
spite of Fujimori's very high popularity rating, the parties were able to win 
the municipalities of a number of departmental capitals, taking advantage of 
the inability of Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoria's inability to field credible 
candidates or to organise itself nationally. The 1993 referendum result also 
suggests that the personal popularity of the president did not necessarily 
translate into approval of many of his government's policies, and that in 
certain circumstances he could be made to look vulnerable. 
Looking further ahead, however, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that 
Peru's political parties are not likely to recover, at least in the form that we 
have known them since 1980. While Fujimori remains president, he will 
probably do his best to prevent their revival.19 He himself has made it clear 
that he will resist the temptation to try to convert Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoria 
into a fully-fledged party. However, as we have seen, while Fujimori has 
benefited from the unpopularity of the parties, his rise to power was more a 
consequence than a cause of their decline. Their predicament was made 
worse by the actions taken by Fujimori to marginalise them, but the real 
reasons for their decay lay elsewhere. 
Whether or not party political activity begins to reassert itself during 
Fujimori's second government will depend on whether he manages to 
maintain his popularity and that of his government. As the traumas of 
hyperinflation and political violence begin to fade in people's minds, it may 
become more difficult for the government to rally public support around 
condemnation of the 'partidocracia'. At the same time, if widespread social 
discontent begins to reassert itself it will need to express itself politically in 
one form or another. Furthermore, the personalismo of the Fujimori 
government raises the problem of succession and the issue of which candidate 
people will support if he can no longer stand. 
Whether the traditional parties prove capable of rising from the ashes will 
depend on their ability to renew their leadership, reformulate the ways they 
organise themselves, and present the public with credible alternatives. There 
are some indications that a few of the hard lessons learnt by the parties since 
the late 1980s have been assimiliated and that this could lead in some cases 
to changes in their political personality. One aspect of this autocritica is the 
admission among many politicians that parties should seek to become more 
open, democratic and responsive to their grass roots. However, the extent to 
which this autocritica translates into tangible changes in political methods 
remains to be seen. The parties which are probably most vulnerable are those 
which are most personalista in the sense that they are little more than 
vehicles of individual politicians. Those that should have greater staying 
power are those with stronger roots in popular political culture. For this 
19 Fujimori and his supporters are capable of using the advantages at their 
disposal to put further difficulties in the way of the parties. One example was 
the passage of a law through Congress with lightning speed in May 1995 greatly 
to increase the numbers of signatures required by parties to achieve official 
recognition. The idea appears to have been to profit from their poor 
performance in the April elections to prevent them fielding candidates in the 
November 1995 municipal elections. 
reason, APRA's chances of long-term survival are probably better than those 
of AP. 
If old parties are to revive, or if new parties are successfully to emerge, 
they will do so reflecting the changed political and economic conditions in the 
country. The main forms of popular organisation within society have 
undergone drastic change in the decade 1985-95, with the weakening of such 
traditional forms as the trade union and other kinds of gremio. Other forms 
have emerged with greater force, such as neighbourhood organisations and 
other kinds of collective self-help. At the other end of the divide that parties 
are expected to bridge, the state has also undergone radical change, shorn of 
almost all its major public companies and many of its other functions. The 
ways in which state patronage affects party development will differ from the 
past. 
It seems reasonable to believe, therefore, that, as memories of the 
destructive crisis of the late 1980s fade, as the public starts to look forward 
rather than backward, new political cleavages will begin to emerge around 
new issues, and that new forms of party organisation will begin to emerge. 
Whether these bear the names of the old parties or not, such groupings are 
likely to be very different creatures from their forbears. 

